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Sklonost kognitivnim pristrasnostima

dc.contributor.advisorKnežević, Goran
dc.contributor.otherKostić, Aleksandar
dc.contributor.otherOpačić, Goran
dc.contributor.otherŽeželj, Iris
dc.creatorTeovanović, Predrag
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-09T13:07:03Z
dc.date.available2021-06-09T13:07:03Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/3303
dc.identifier.urihttp://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=1236
dc.identifier.urihttps://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:8171/bdef:Content/download
dc.identifier.urihttp://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=523571863
dc.identifier.urihttp://rfasper.fasper.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/6
dc.description.abstractCognitive biases, predictable deviations of cognitive processes' outcomes from rational normatives, are examined in eight studies by using a methodological and conceptual apparatus of differential psychology. Anchoring effect, the common human tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information offered, was the subject of the first study. Apart from confirming curvilinearity of the anchor-distance function, results revealed that factor of fluid intelligence (gf) effects this quadratic function in a way that more intelligent subjects have the same range of plausible answers as other subjects, but they consider a wider range of anchor values as plausible. Their response pattern can be perceived as a strategy of maintaining lower risk in a wider range of values, which at the bivariate level results in the absence of correlation between gf and anchoring effect. Direct gf effect on anchoring, observed in the conditions of high cognitive reflection, speaks in favour of the assumption that, besides automatic processes (selective accessibility), the anchoring effect is also influenced by serial processes (insufficient adjustment), which is in compliance with the general notion of dual process theories (DPT). Belief bias, effect of the empirical status of a conclusion on the outcome of abstract reasoning process, was the subject of the second study. Effect is consistently demonstrated in four basic types of syllogism by a decline in achievement after introducing the conflict between empirical and logical conclusion statuses. In compliance with DPT expectations, gf predicts individual differences in the subjects’ achievements when plausibility and validity of conclusion are in conflict, but not when there is a concurrence between them. In the same conditions, the measures of a cognitive reflection incrementally contribute to the (explanation) of the achievement variance, which can also be understood as a confirmation of the assumption that individual differences in rational reasoning cannot be reduced to intelligence. People’s systematic tendency of overestimating their own abilities is traditionally expressed through the score of difference between subjective and objective probability of giving correct answers, namely the overconfidence effect. In order to avoid an objection about the algebra origin of bias measure in the scores of achievement (intelligence), the third study empirically investigates alternative measures. Results show that achievement estimations of more intelligent subjects are more discriminative, particularly that the more intelligent subjects are more confident about their correct answers while less confident about the wrong ones...en
dc.description.abstractKognitivne pristrasnosti, empirijski fenomeni sistematskog odstupanja ishoda kognitivnih procesa od racionalnih normativa, istraženi su kroz osam studija korišćenjem metodološkog i pojmovnog aparata psihologije individualnih razlika. Efekat ukotvljavanja, koji se tiče predvidive sklonosti ljudi da zasnivaju procene različitih vrednosti na irelevantnim numeričkim informacijama, bio je predmet prve studije. Pored toga što potvrđuju postojanje krivolinijskog odnosa između stepena udaljenosti kotve i veličine efekta ukotvljavanja, rezultati pokazuju da fluidna inteligencija oblikuje kvadratnu funkciju ukotvljavanja na takav način da inteligentniji ispitanici imaju isti raspon plauzabilnih odgovora kao i ostali subjekti, ali da plauzabilnim doživljavaju širi raspon vrednosti kotvi. Inteligentniji obrazac odgovora može se razumeti kao strategija prihvatanja niže stope rizika u širem rasponu vrednosti, što na bivarijatnom nivou rezultuje odsustvom povezanosti inteligencije i ukupne veličine efekta ukotvljavanja. Direktan efekat inteligencije na veličinu efekta ukotvljavanja zabeležen je u uslovima visoke reflektivnosti. Ovi nalazi su u skladu sa pretpostavkom da, pored automatskih (selektivna dostupnost), razumevanju efekta ukotvljavanja doprinose i serijalni procesi (nedovoljno podešavanje), što je saglasno opštem stanovištu teorija dualnih procesa (TDP). Pristrasnost uverenja, koja predstavlja efekat empirijskog statusa zaključka na ishode procesa apstraktnog rezonovanja, bila je predmet druge studije. Efekat uverljivosti dosledno je demonstriran na četiri osnovna tipa silogizma padom postignuća nakon uvođenja konflikta između empirijskog i logičkog statusa zaključka. U skladu sa očekivanjima TDP, faktor fluidne inteligencije predviđa individualne razlike u postignuću ispitanika onda kada su uverljivost i validnost zaključka u konfliktu, ali ne i onda kada su usaglašene. Pored toga, mere reflektivnog uma u uslovima konflikta ostvaruju značajne inkrementalne doprinose razumevanju varijanse postignuća, što ukazuje na to da individualne razlike u racionalnom mišljenju nisu svodive na inteligenciju. Pristrasnost preteranog pouzdanja, koja se odnosi na sistematsku sklonost ljudi da precenjuju vlastite sposobnosti, tradicionalno se izražava putem skora razlike između subjektivne i objektivne verovatnoće davanja tačnih odgovora, i predstavlja predmet treće studije. Kako bi se izbegao prigovor o algebarskom poreklu mere pristrasnosti u skorovima postignuća (inteligencije), u trećoj studiji su empirijski razmotrene prednosti i nedostaci alternativnih mera. Rezultati pokazuju da su subjektivne procene inteligentnijih subjekata diskriminativnije, odnosno da su inteligentniji ispitanici pouzdaniji u svoje tačne i manje pouzdani u svoje pogrešne odgovore, ali i da mere pouzdanja međusobno koreliraju visoko bez obzira na to da li se odnose na tačne ili pogrešne odgovore...sr
dc.languagesr
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179018/RS//
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceUniverzitet u Beogradu
dc.subjectcognitive biasesen
dc.subjectrationalityen
dc.subjectindividual differencesen
dc.subjectdual process theoriesen
dc.subjectkognitivne pristrasnostisr
dc.subjectracionalnostsr
dc.titleSusceptibility to cognitive biasesen
dc.titleSklonost kognitivnim pristrasnostimasr
dc.typedoctoralThesis
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rfasper.fasper.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/424/3.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubhttps://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_3303
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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